The Covenant of Seisin by Reilly, Edward T.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 10 
Number 1 Volume 10, December 1935, Number 
1 
Article 5 
May 2014 
The Covenant of Seisin 
Edward T. Reilly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Reilly, Edward T. (1935) "The Covenant of Seisin," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 10 : No. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
General's department of the United States36 in support of the Act
difficult to distinguish. There are dicta in these very cases which the
Court may rely upon to declare the Act unconstitutional. For
example, in the case of Magnano v. Hamilton 3 7 the Court said:
"That clause (the Fourteenth Amendment) 3" is applicable to
a taxing statute such as the one assailed only if the act be so
arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve
an exertion of the taxing power; but constitutes, in substance
and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden
power, as, for example, the confiscation of property."
The carriers will undoubtedly cite the Child Labor Tax Case 39
as authority for the proposition that this Act exceeds the taxing
power of Congress. Such application by the Court would be unfor-
tunate, since the Child Labor Tax 40 was held to be unconstitutional
on the express grounds that the tax sought to exercise a forbidden
power through the use of a penalty, and has since been distinguished
by Magnano v. Hamilton.41 It is clear that the tax in Railroad
Retirement Act 42 is not designed to act as a penalty. Whether or
not the Supreme Court will declare the new Act unconstitutional
depends, it would seem, on the willingness of the Court to employ
the objectivity exemplified by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
WILLIAM H. QUASHA.
THE COVENANT OF SEISIN.
I
Since no covenant is to be implied in a conveyance of real estate
in New York,' a purchaser in the absence of fraud, accident or
mutual mistake, must look to whatever covenants his deed actually
contains for indemnity should the title prove defective or fail. 2 Con-
sequently, among many things, the usual warranty deed embraces an
undertaking on the part of the grantor that he is seised as owner, at
PRENTICE-HALL, LABOR AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, Fed.
26,125 (1935).
"292 U. S. 40, 54 Sup. Ct. 599 (1934).
"The constitutionality of a state tax was in issue.
(Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.) 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922).
40 TAX ON EMPLOYMENT OF CHILD LABOR, C. 18, 40 STAT. 1138, 26 U. S. C.
A. §702 (1919).
" Supra note 37; see Note (1934) 47 HARV. L. lxv. 1229.
Szpra note -8.
IN. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §251.
'Whitbeck v. Waine, 16 N. Y. 532, 535 (1858).
1935 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the time of the grant, of the land which the deed purports to convey.
This assurance to the purchaser that the covenantor is possessed of
the very estate in quantity and quality which his conveyance intends
to transfer is called the "covenant of or for seisin."
The covenant need be couched in no particular terms; it need
merely be but a stipulation or declaration that the grantor is seised
of an estate of the quantum which he undertakes to convey. The
New York short form of deed, culled mainly from the fuller lan-
guage of former deeds, simply words this covenant for title as
follows: "That the party of the first part is seised of said premises
in fee simple * * *." 3 The construction to be given to such words,
however, is prescribed by statute as follows: "A covenant that
the grantor 'is seised of the said premises (described) in fee
simple, * * *,' must be construed as meaning that such grantor, at
the time of the execution and delivery of the conveyance, is lawfully
seised of a good, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in
fee simple, of and in all and singular the premises thereby conveyed,
with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belong-
ing, * * *"4 Thus it may be seen that in New York as in most
American jurisdictions 5 and in England, 6 the covenant of seisin is
construed in compliance with the meaning "seised" and "seisin",
acquired after the Statute of Uses; the covenant is not satisfied by a
tortious possession.7
The covenant of or for seisin applies not only to the land itself
but extends as well to all buildings,8 fences,9 fixtures, 10 and such
other things as are properly appurtenant to the land 11 and which
would pass by a conveyance of the freehold.
'N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §258.
'Id. §253, subd. 1.
'Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 373 (1827) ; Comstock v. Comstock, 23
Conn. 349 (1854) ; Allen v. Allen, 48 Minn. 462, 51 N. W. 473 (1892); Parker
v. Brown, 15 N. H. 177 (1844); Pringle v. Witten's Ex'rs, 1 Bay 256 (S. C.
1792) ; Catlin v. Hurlburt, 3 Vt. 403 (1831) ; Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 106 (1849).
'Young v. Raincock, 7 C. B. 310 (1849).
"In some jurisdictions, among which Maine and Massachusetts are promi-
nent, by reason of a survival of the feudal definition of seisin, the covenant is
not considered broken if the grantor be actually in possession of the land
claiming such title as he undertakes to convey though seised only as a wrong-
doer in adverse possession. Watts v. Parker, 27 Ill. 223 (1862) ; Marston v.
Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433 (1807) ; Bearce v. Jackson, 4 Mass. 408 (1808) ; Raymond
v. Raymond, 10 Cush. 134 (Mass. 1852) ; Cushman v. Blanchard, 2 Greenl. 266(Me. 1823); Fairbrother v. Griffin, 10 Me. 91 (1833); Wilson v. Widenham,51 Me. 566 (1863) ; Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510 (1879) ; Stambaugh v.
Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584 (1873) ; Wetzell v. Richcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N. E.
1004 (1895).
'Burke v. Nichols, 2 Keyes 671 (N. Y. 1866); Steam v. Hesdorfer, 9
Misc. 134, 29 N. Y. Supp. 281 (1894).
'Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564 (1848).
"Herzog v. Marx, 202 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 1063 (1911).
'Adams v. Conover, 87 N. Y. 422 (1880) (Right of flowage) ; Sweet v.
Howell, 96 App. Div. 45, 89 N. Y. Supp. 21 (3d Dept. 1904) (Right to take
water from a spring on adjacent land).
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II
The covenant of seisin is a covenant de praesenti; it is worded
in the present tense and relates to something being or existing at the
time it is made. If this covenant is ever violated, its breach will be
simultaneous with its making. Thus, if the grantor be not seised, the
covenant is broken the moment the deed is delivered.12  Thereafter,
the covenant cannot be affected or broken, no matter what might
occur to defeat the title.13 Immediately the covenant of seisin is
breached the grantee has a right of action to recover damages and
to sustain such an action it is not essential that an eviction be
shown.1
4
The covenant of seisin is broken when the grantor does not
actually possess, at the time of the conveyance, that very title, to the
entire premises he purports to convey, which his covenant in express
terms or by construction declares him to have. So, the covenant is
breached if the grantor, purporting to convey an estate in fee simple,
is not seised of the freehold 15 or holds title to a part of the land
only 16 or has but a life estate.17 This covenant is also regarded as
violated by the fact that things annexed to the premises such as
fences,' 8 plumbing fixtures 19 and so forth, belong to others and are
subject to a right of removal. Likewise, it is broken if the covenantor
has no rightful title to interests which should pass under the deed
as appurtenances as in the case of a right to take water from a spring
situate on adjoining land 20 or a right to overflow neighboring fields.2'
However, no breach of the covenant of seisin occurs if the statement
of quantity of land is merely descriptive when the land conveyed
See Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. 1, 4 (N. Y. 1806); Hamilton v.
Wilson, 4 Johns. 72, 72 (N. Y. 1809); Abbott v. Allen, 14 Johns. 248, 253(N. Y. 1817) ; McCarty v. Leggett, 3 Hill 134, 135 (N. Y. 1842) ; Bingham v.
Weiderwax, 1 N. Y. 509, 513 (1848) ; Nichols v. Nichols, 5 Hun 108, 108
(N. Y. 1875); Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N. Y. 212, 218, 26 N. E. 611 (1891);
Werner v. Wheeler, 124 App. Div. 358, 365, 127 N. Y. Supp. 158, 165 (1st
Dept. 1911); Hilliker v. Rueger, 228 N. Y. 11, 15, 126 N. E. 266, 267 (1920) ;
Havens v. Howell, 243 App. Div. 206, 207, 278 N. Y. Supp. 223, 224 (2d
Dept. 1935).
"Coit v. McRenolds, 2 Robt. 655 (N. Y. 1864).
" See Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1, 9 (N. Y. 1809) ; Kent v. Welch, 7
Johns. 258, 260 (N. Y. 1810); Abbott v. Allen, 14 Johns. 248, 254 (N. Y.
1817); Rickert v. Snyder, 9 Wend. 416, 421 (N. Y. 1832); Veit v. McClauslan,
157 App. Div. 335, 337, 142 N. Y. Supp. 281, 283 (2d Dept. 1913) ; Murphy v.
United States Title Guaranty Co., 104 Misc. 607, 610, 172 N. Y. Supp. 243,
245 (1918) ; Hilliker v. Rueger, 228 N. Y. 11, 15, 126 N. E. 266, 267 (1920).
" Staats v. The Executors of Ten Eyck, 3 Caines 111 (N. Y. 1805) ; In re
Boylan's Estate, 119 Misc. 545, 197 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1922).
"0 Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 (N. Y. 1809) ; Roak v. Sullivan, 69 Misc.
429, 125 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1910).
" Tanner v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 83 (N. Y. 1834).
'Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564 (1848).
"Herzog v. Marx, 202 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 1063 (1911).
"Sweet v. Howell, 96 App. Div. 45, 89 N. Y. Supp. 21 (3d Dept. 1904).
"Adams v. Conover, 22 Hun 424 (N. Y. 1880).
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contains a less amount than that specified in such statement. 22 The
grantor's covenant is not necessarily broken by the fact that the land
is in the possession of a third party at the time of the conveyance
unless such possession is adverse so as to render the deed void for
champerty. 23 An encroachment upon the street or adjoining property
of structures erected upon the land conveyed does not create a breach
of this covenant.2 4 The presence of a judgment against the granted
property 25 or the existence of a mortgage thereon 26 does not consti-
tute a breach of the covenant. Nor is it transgressed in the circum-
stances that part of the land is subject to a highway easement in
the public. 2 7
The usual remedy for a breach of the covenant of seisin is an
action at law to recover damages. The action may be brought, at
any time after the breach; the grantee need not wait until he has been
evicted 28 and in his action for damages it is sufficient to allege the
breach by negativing the words of the covenant.29 But for the pur-
pose of the running of the Statute of Limitations, a cause of action
on this covenant is not deemed to have accrued until eviction.30 Such
an action is denied, however, to a grantee asserting a violation of the
grantor's undertaking by reason of the fact that the title was, at the
time of the conveyance, in himself and not in the covenantor. This
is so because the covenant of seisin is a guaranty only against any
title existing in a third person, which might defeat the estate granted.31
In the action brought by the vendee for a breach of this cove-
nant, evidence that the grantor, since the conveyance and before suit
was brought, acquired a good title is not admissible in bar of the
cause of action.32 But if the action is not brought until the grantor
has obtained a deed of the property and actually vested title in the
grantee, the grantee cannot recover substantial damages.3 3 Thus in
an action to foreclose a purchase money mortgage on land situate in
New York, a counterclaim for breach of the covenant of seisin,
alleging plaintiffs' title to be defective at the time of sale because
' Mann v. Pearson, 2 Johns. 37 (N. Y. 1806).
'Nichols v. Nichols, 5 Hun 424 (N. Y. 1875).
"4Burke v. Nichols, 2 Keyes 671 (N. Y. 1866) ; Stearn v. Hesdorfer, 9
Misc. 134, 29 N. Y. Supp. 281 (1894); see Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 8 Misc.
149, 150, 140 N. Y. Supp. 973, 974 (1913).
'Sedgwick v. Hollenback, 7 Johns. 376 (N. Y. 1811).
" Stanard v. Eldridge, 16 Johns. 254 (N. Y. 1819).
-Whitbeck v. Cook, 15 Johns. 483 (N. Y. 1818).
'Supra note 14.
Abbott v. Allen, 14 Johns. 248 (N. Y. 1817) ; Rickert v. Snyder, 9 Wend.
416 (N. Y. 1832); Veit v. McCauslan, 157 App. Div. 335, 142 N. Y. Supp.
281 (2d Dept. 1913).
N. Y. C. P. A. §47.
" Fitch v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 161 (N. Y. 1819).
' See McCarty v. Leggett, 3 Hill 134, 135 (N. Y. 1842).
See Murphy v. United States Title Guaranty Co., 104 Misc. 607, 610,
172 N. Y. Supp. 243, 245 (1918) ; Havens v. Howell, 243 App. Div. 206, 207,
278 N. Y. Supp. 223, 224 (2d Dept. 1935).
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derived from liquidators of a foreign corporation appointed by a
foreign court, was not upheld when it appeared that plaintiffs obtained
a confirmatory deed from the corporation itself before the counter-
claim was served and before demand was made for repayment of
the purchase price. It was said that if the confirmatory deed did
not destroy the cause of action on the covenant of seisin it made the
damages but nominal. 34  Nevertheless, in an action for breach of
the covenant of seisin the grantor is not allowed to give in evidence
a title acquired by him subsequent to the bringing of the action; but
the rights of the parties must be determined according to their exis-
tence and extent, at the time when the action was commenced. 35 And
in a suit for specific performance, where a grantor, who at the time
was being sued on the covenant of seisin, attempted to foist a con-
veyance of such subsequently acquired title upon the grantee it was
held that the court had no power to compel the grantee to receive the
deed, or to interfere with his action on the covenant.30
III
The older cases enunciate the principle that covenants of title
run with the land until they are breached. And the covenants of
seisin, of power to convey and against incumbrances, being covenants
de praesenti, if broken at all were deemed to be broken as soon as
made and so were regarded as covenants which did not run with the
land. The real reason for such a doctrine appears to be that the
covenants being breached upon delivery of the deed. the grantee
became possessed of an immediate right of action, purely personal
in himself, because at that time choses in action were incapable of
assignment. Consequently no one but the covenantee or his personal
representatives could take advantage of these covenants.3 7  Thus,
some of the covenants for title, intended by the parties to assure,
strengthen and support the title in exactly the same way as the other
covenants which were held to run with the land, could not benefit
subsequent grantees of the land who derived the same title from the
original covenantee. Today, however, choses in action are assign-
able 3s and if the covenant of seisin is intended not merely for the
benefit of the covenantee but for the protection of all who derive
their title through him, it should be given effect accordingly. The
benefit of the covenant of seisin should be held to be assigned by the
mere delivery of each subsequent deed unless it is expressly reserved
or has already been extinguished. According to the letter, there is
" Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N. Y. 33, 161 N. E. 321 (1928).
' See Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49, 54 (N. Y. 1809).
"Tucker v. Clarke, 2 Sandf. Ch. 96 (N. Y. 1844).
Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. 1 (N. Y. 1806) ; Hamilton v. Wilson, 4
Johns. 72 (N. Y. 1809) ; see Blyden v. Cotheal, 1 Duer 176, 197 (N. Y. 1852).
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §41.
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a breach of the covenant of seisin at the delivery of the deed con-
taining it, but according to the spirit a subsequent grantee making
title through that deed should be allowed to proceed directly against
the original covenantor for damages because of the defective title.
This theory has been utilized by the courts in dealing with the
covenant against incumbrances 3 9 and by analogy it is equally adaptable
to the covenant of seisin. So that today it would seem that if ever a
covenantee did not exercise his right of action on the covenant of
seisin but conveyed the premises to another, that other could sue upon
the covenant although a remote grantee and notwithstanding the
absence of an express assignment. The measure of damages to be
recovered in such an action should be exactly the same amount as
the original covenantee himself would have been entitled to had he
sued, the theory being that the remote grantee stands in the position
of an assignee of a chose in action.
IV
When a total breach of the covenant of seisin occurs, the measure
of damages recoverable is the value of the land at the time of the
conveyance; the best estimate of such value being the agreed purchase
price expressed in the deed.4 0  However, the consideration expressed
in the conveyance is only prima faie evidence of the amount to be
recovered. The true consideration for the grant, and any deficit in the
payment thereof, may be established by parol, although a different
consideration is stated in the deed, and notwithstanding an acknowledg-
ment on the part of the grantor in the deed that it has been paid. 41 At
'Boyd v. Belmont, 58 How. Pr. 513 (N. Y. 1880) ; Andrews v. Appel, 22
Hun 429 (N. Y. 1880); Coleman v. Bresnaham, 54 Hun 619, 8 N. Y. Supp.
158 (1889) ; Clarke v. Priest, 21 App. Div. 174, 47 N. Y. Supp. 489 (2d Dept.
1897) ; General Underwriting Co. of New York v. Stilwell, 139 App. Div. 189,
123 N. Y. Supp. 653 (1910); Feldman v. Six Eleven Realty Co., Inc., 125
Misc. 821, 211 N. Y. Supp. 585 (1925) ; see Geiszler v. De Graaf, 166 N. Y.
339, 59 N. E. 993 (1901); Mandigo v. Conway, 45 Misc. 389, 391, 90 N. Y.
Supp. 324, 325 (1904); Gamorsil Realty Corporation v. Graef, 128 Misc. 596,
599, 220 N. Y. Supp. 221, 223 (1926).
, Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, 3 Caines 111 (N. Y. 1805) ; Pitcher v. Liv-
ingston, 4 Johns. 1 (N. Y. 1809) ; Caulkins v. Harris, 9 Johns. 324 (N. Y.
1812); Bennet v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. 50 (N. Y. 1816); Kinney v. Watts, 14
Wend. 38 (N. Y. 1835) (covenant of quiet enjoyment-rule of damages same) ;
In re Boylan's Estate, 119 Misc. 545, 197 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1922) ; see Sweet v.
Howell, 96 App. Div. 45, 47, 89 N. Y. Supp. 21, 22 (3d Dept. 1904) ; Murphy
v. United States Title Guaranty Co., 104 Misc. 607, 610, 172 N. Y. Supp. 243,
245 (1918).
" Shephard v. Little, 14 Johns. 210 (N. Y. 1817); M'Crea v. Purmort, 16
Wend. 460 (N. Y. 1836); Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill 643 (N. Y. 1843)
(upholding general rule but restricting its use to the immediate parties to the
deed) ; Bingham v. Weiderwax, 1 N. Y. 509 (1848). Contra: Schemerhorn v,
Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 139 (N. Y. 1806); Maigley v. Hauer, 7 Johns. 341
(N. Y. 181).
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any rate it is the actual purchase price which should be recovered
when there has been a total breach of the covenant of seisin. Interest
will be allowed on this amount for so long a time as the grantee is
liable to the true owner for the mesne profits, i. e. for no more than
six years.42  If perchance the possession of the purchaser has con-
tinued for such a length of time that, under the Statute of Limita-
tions, it has ripened into a valid title, it would seem that only nominal
damages could be recovered.4 3
When the covenant of seisin is breached, the grantee may elect
to recover the purchase money and interest or he may purchase the
outstanding title at the expense of the covenantor. Whether there
is a total or partial breach of the covenant, the amount necessarily
paid by the grantee in acquiring the outstanding title, is usually the
measure of the recovery. The money so expended is not to exceed
the amount of the consideration paid to the original grantor. And
money disbursed in extinguishing a void title or in procuring mere
evidence of existing title in the covenantee is not recoverable.44
Costs and expenses, including counsel fees, incurred by the grantee
in defending his title when a direct attack is made upon it, may be
recovered.4 5 As the theory of damages in relation to this covenant
is that the estimate of loss must be taken as of the date of delivery
of the deed, the vendee cannot recover from the vendor for any
enhancement in the value of the premises, whether such acceleration
was due to the expenditure of effort and money by the vendee in
improvements thereon or to a natural appreciation in its value.40  Of
course if the grantee, as part of the consideration for the conveyance,
engages to make certain improvements upon the land and does
perform his agreement the value of such improvements should be
included in the assessment of damages.4 7
As was said before, the covenant of seisin is broken if the
grantor was not seised of the very estate in quantity and quality
which his deed purported to convey. But, however, if any title what-
soever passes by his deed to the grantee, the covenant of seisin is
Caulkins v. Harris, 9 Johns. 324 (N. Y. 1812).
'
3 Supra notes 33 and 34.
" Werner v. Wheeler, 142 App. Div. 358, 127 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1st Dept.
1911); Havens v. Howell, 243 App. Div. 206, 278 N. Y. Supp. 223 (2d Dept.
1935); cf. Roak v. Sullivan, 96 Misc. 429, 125 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1910) ; see
Delavergne v. Norris, 7 Johns. 358, 359 (N. Y. 1811) ; Hilliker v. Rueger, 228
N. Y. 11, 15, 126 N. E. 266, 267 (1920).
" Staats v. Ten Eyck's Ex'rs, 3 Caines 111 (N. Y. 1805); Hilliker v.
Rueger, 228 N. Y. 11, 126 N. E. 266 (1920) ; see Bennet v. Jenkins, 13 Johns.
50, 51 (N. Y. 1816); Grantier v. Austin, 66 Hun 157, 159 (N. Y. 1892);
Olmstead v. Rawson, 188 N. Y. 517, 522, 81 N. E. 456, 458 (1907).
"' Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1 (N. Y. 1809) ; In re Boylan's Estate,
119 Misc. 545, 197 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1922); see Bennet v. Jenkins, 13 Johns.
50, 51 (N. Y. 1816) ; Dimmick v. Lockwood, 10 Wend. 142, 149 (N. Y. 1833) ;
Kinney v. Watts, 14 Wend. 38, 41 (N. Y. 1835) ; Kelly v. Dutch Church of
Schenectady, 2 Hill 105, 115 (N. Y. 1841) ; Hunt v. Raplee, 44 Hun 149, 155
(N. Y. 1887).
"' See Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 165, 170 (1868).
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considered as only partially breached. And when there is only a
partial breach of the covenant, it would seem that the entire consid-
eration money may not be recovered but the vendee may only recover
pro tanto.48  Thus where grantors covenanted that they were seised
of an absolute estate of inheritance in fee simple in the premises,
while they only possessed a life estate, the covenant was held to be
partially breached and the grantee could only recover a proportional
part of the consideration, the value of such life estate being deducted
as his title to that extent was good.49 In such actions to recover for
the partial breach of the covenant, the usual measure of damages
allowed is such part of the original price as bears the same ratio to
the whole consideration that the value of the land to which title has
failed bears to the value of the whole premises. 50 The same general
principles concerning interest, costs, improvements, etc., mentioned
above and which govern the final recovery when there is a total
breach, apply likewise in these actions.
EDWARD T. REILLY.
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE-COMMENT ON THE ACCUSED'S
FAILURE TO TESTIFY-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
At a meeting held September 12, 1935, the Judicial Council of
the State of New York publicly announced through its chairman,
Chief Justice Crane, the drafting of a bill to be submitted to the next
session of the state legislature, amending the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure so as to permit comment by the prosecuting at-
torney on the failure of the defendant in a criminal trial to testify
in his own behalf.' A similar bill, sponsored by the Attorney-General,
was introduced to the recent session of the New York legislature
"Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 (N. Y. 1809).
"Tanner v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 83 (N. Y. 1834).
'Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 (N. Y. 1809); Guthrie v. Pugsley, 12
Johns. 126 (N. Y. 1815) ; Kane v. Sanger, 14 Johns. 89 (N. Y. 1816) ; Wager
v. Schuyler, 1 Wend. 553 (N. Y. 1828); Tanner v. Livingston, 12 Wend. 83
(N. Y. 1834) ; Giles v. Dugro, 1 Duer 331 (N. Y. 1852) ; Furniss v. Ferguson,
15 N. Y. 443 (1857); Hunt v. Raplee, 44 Hun 149 (N. Y. 1887); Grantier v.
Austin, 66 Hun 157 (N. Y. 1892) ; Brown v. Allen, 73 Hun 291 (N. Y. 1893) ;
Sweet v. Howell, 96 App. Div. 45, 89 N. Y. Supp. 21 (3d Dept. 1904) ; Roak
v. Sullivan, 96 Misc. 429, 125 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1910) ; Hilliker v. Rueger, 228
N. Y. 11, 126 N. E. 266 (1920).
IN. Y. L. J., Sept. 17, 1935. See also REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMrrE
ON THE REvIsION OF THE N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, tentative draft
of chapter on Preliminary Examination, tit. III, c. 3, §198, in N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 23, 1935.
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